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CHILDREN OF A LESSER GOD: GDR 
LAWYERS IN POST-SOCIALIST GERMANY 
Inga Markovits* 
Historical events create their own vocabulary. One of the new 
words spawned by the collapse of socialism is "lustration": the vetting 
process by which former socialist officials are examined for their in-
volvement in perversions of justice under the old regimes and for their 
suitability to be employed by the new ones. East European countries 
have thrown themselves into the task with differing amounts of energy. 
Some countries, like Russia and Bulgaria, consumed with more urgent 
problems, barely have bothered. Others, like Hungary and the former 
Czechoslovakia, passed lustration statutes that promptly were attacked 
for violating constitutional principles that lustration indirectly was in-
tended to promote. In Poland, legislators found it so difficult to agree 
on the goals and methods of the cleansing process that seven different 
drafts of lustration laws failed in parliament.1 No other country tackled 
the job as thoroughly as Germany, where reunification on October 3, 
* Friends of Joe Jamail Professor of Law, The University of Texas. Dr. jur. 1967, 
Freie Universitiit Berlin; LL.M. 1969, Yale. This essay is part of a larger research pro-
ject on the rise and fall of socialist law in the GDR, reflected in everyday legal life in 
one East German town, in the work of its trial court, and in the experience of the 
court's staff and its users. I am very grateful to the German Volkswagen-Stiftung with-
out whose generous help I never could have embarked on this project, nor carried out 
the extensive fieldwork it reqµired. I also owe thanks to the National Science Founda-
tion: both for its support of a related study investigating changes in East German legal 
reasoning accompanying the collapse of socialism (Grant# SES - 9210575), and for the 
financial help that enabled me to spend a rewarding year at the Center for Advanced 
Study in the Behavioral Sciences in Stanford (Grant# SES - 9022192), where the pres-
ent paper was completed. My stay at the Center was also supported by a Faculty Re-
search Assignment from the University of Texas whose help is gratefully 
acknowledged. 
All personal quotes in this paper stem from interviews connected with these two 
projects. To protect the anonymity of the people I write about, I have renamed my town 
Liiritz and have omitted all attributions of quotations that might reveal the identity of 
the speaker. My empirical data, unless otherwise attributed, are based either on court 
files from the Liiritz District Court or on records concerning the Liiritz court or con-
cerning other matters of judicial administration that originally were kept by the former 
GDR Ministry of Justice and now are on file with the Bundesarchiv in Potsdam. 
1. For an overview of East European lustration efforts see Andrea Stauber, Die 
Geset;,gebung der ehemaligen Ostblockstaaten zur Bewiiltigung ihrer sozialistischen 
Vergangenheit, 49 NEUE Jusnz [NJ] 455 (1995). 
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1990, brought a sweeping exchange of bureaucratic elites on the terri-
tory of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). 
You might say that Germany's lustration policy was shaped and fa-
cilitated by the Berlin Wall. Though it had tumbled down, the Wall still 
lived in people's memory. It still could serve to draw the line between 
those to be vetted and those who were to do the vetting and thus helped 
to avoid the conundrum plaguing other East European countries, where 
guilty and innocent, purged and purgers, were harder to distinguish. 
And unlike elsewhere in Eastern Europe, posts from which tainted offi-
cials had been ousted in East Germany could be filled with applicants 
from the West, so that former Party hacks did not have to be left in of-
fice just for want of a replacement. The Wall, and its continued pres-
ence in people's minds, made the lustration process in Germany more 
ruthless, but arguably also more principled, than elsewhere since deci-
sions whether to remove or not to remove someone from office could 
be made by outsiders rather than by those themselves entangled in 
events, and could be reached without concern for such mundane matters 
as the need to keep things going. 
In this essay, I want to investigate German vetting policies by 
looking at one particular subgroup of examinees: GDR lawyers. In Ger-
many, no other former socialist elite has been submitted to so thorough 
an ideological cleansing process as the legal profession. After reunifica-
tion, all GDR judges and prosecutors hoping to remain in office had to 
undergo investigations that by March 1994 had left only 9.2% of their 
former numbers in permanent positions. 2 Virtually all East German law 
professors were removed from their university posts.3 More than 5000 
attorneys in Germany's eastern half are currently being examined for 
2. My figure is based on the data provided by a 1994 inquiry by the East German 
law journal Neue Justiz of the justice administrations of the new East German states. 
See Obernahme ostdeutscher Richter und Staatsanwiilte in den Justizdienst auf Leben-
szeit, 48 NJ 266 (1994). The percentage of East Germans among Germany's judges is 
likely to have risen since then because not all readmitted East German judges and pros-
ecutors, at the time of the inquiry in March 1994, had successfully completed their 
three-year trial program during which a candidate for the Bench does not yet have ten-
ure. In 1989, the GDR employed 1493 judges and 1237 prosecutors. See Hubert 
Rottleuthner, Zur Steuerung der Justiz in der DDR, in STEUERUNG DER Jusnz IN DER 
DDR 28 (Hubert Rottleuthner ed., 1994). Of that total of 2730 officials, 1083, or 
39.7%, were admitted into the nontenured trial stage. Obernahme ostdeutscher Richter 
und Staatsanwiilte in den Justizdienst auf Lebenszeit, supra, at 266. Of these, by March 
1, 1994, 251 had obtained tenure. Even with new probationary judges receiving tenure 
after March 1, 1994, I would not expect the percentage of formerly socialist judges in 
East Germany to more than double. 
3. See INGA MARKOVITS, IMPERFECT JUSTICE: AN EAST-WEST GERMAN DIARY 86-87, 
99-102, 128-39, 177, 186, 192 (1995). 
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former contacts with the State Security apparatus (Stasi)4 and other 
transgressions.5 And of all prosecutions for "government crimes" com-
mitted by socialist officials, between 75% and 80% are directed at for-
mer judges and prosecutors accused of miscarriages of justice. 6 
It makes sense for the new inquisitors to concentrate their efforts 
on lawyers. Essentially, the move from socialism to capitalism can be 
described as a change in legal paradigms: from Plan to contract; from 
criminal law, ensuring citizens' compliance, to constitutional law, pro-
tecting their rights; from Party rule to the rule of law. Those functiona-
ries who most intimately were involved in the socialist administration 
of justice therefore also would seem least suitable to hold office in the 
new Rechtsstaat. Still, it is ironic that Germany now, at the supposedly 
festive reunion of its estranged halves, should choose a vetting policy 
far more rigorous than at previous ideological turnabouts in its history. 
In 1918, the Weimar Republic absorbed the judiciary of imperial Ger-
many without visible qualms: although judges were offered retirement 
at full pay if they could not, in good conscience, switch their loyalty 
from a monarchy to a democracy, only 0.15% made use of the offer.7 
Hitler, too (although he called lawyers "the perfect nincompoops"8), 
did not get rid of the legal professionals he inherited from the Weimar 
Republic; on the contrary, he found bourgeois judges and prosecutors 
willing and useful accomplices in the creation of what Carl Schmitt 
called "the national-socialist Rechtsstaat. " 9 Nor did the West Germans, 
for their part, dismiss the Third Reich judiciary when in 1949 they set 
out to establish the rule of law. Turning their backs on earlier Allied at-
4. Stasi stands for MiniSterium fiir Staatssicherheit (Ministry for State Security), 
which employed an army of secret informers who kept tabs on the population. 
5. See M. Kleine-Cosack, Anwaltliche Berufsverbote auf dem Priifstand, 48 NJ 
246 (1994). The review is based on the Statute on Examining the Admissions of Attor-
neys and Notaries (Gesetz zur Priifung van Rechtsanwaltszu/assungen) of July 24, 1992, 
BUNDESGESE1ZBLAIT, TEIL I [BGBl. I] 1386 (F.R.G.). 
6. The estimate is provided by ·M. Lemke, Stand der Aufarbeitung von DDR-
Unrecht durch die Strafjustiz, 49 NJ 237, 238 (1995). Lemke reports that in 1995, Ber-
lin prosecutors alone were investigating about 7,000 suspected cases of Rechtsbeugung 
(literally, "bending the law") by GDR judges and prosecutors. Only very few of the 
prosecutions have led to convictions. 
7. See !NGO Mfu.LER, FURCHTBARE JURISTEN. DIE UNBEWALTIGTE VERGANGENHEIT 
UNSERER JUSTIZ 20 (1988). 
8. HiTLERs TISCHGESPRACHE IM FlrnRERHAUPTQUARTIER 213 (Henry Picker ed., 
1951). 
9. Carl Schmitt, Was bedeutet der Streit um den "Rechtsstaat" ?, 95 ZEITSCHR!Ff 
FiiR DIE GESAMTE STAATSWISSENSCHAFf 198 (1935). For a case study of the adaptation of 
supposedly "apolitical" civil law adjudication to Nazi ideology, see RAINER SCHRODER, 
" ..• ABER IM Z!VILRECHT SIND DIE RICHTER STANDHAFf GEBLIEBEN." DIE URTEILE DES 
OLG CELLE IM DRIITEN REICH (1988). 
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tempts at de-nazifying the Western Zones' administration of justice, 
they soon began to reemploy former Nazi judges and prosecutors, and 
by 1951, the so-called "Article 131 Statute" had settled for good the 
question left open by the Basic Law - what to do about Nazi public 
servants - by providing for their almost complete reintegration.10 Only 
the East German Communists drummed out the lawyers they, in tum, 
had inherited from the Nazis. While on May 8, 1945, about 80% of all 
judges in the Soviet Occupation Zone had been members of Hitler's 
NSDAP, already by December 1945, vetting campaigns had reduced 
that percentage to 22%.11 By the end of 1950, 63% of East German 
judges and 89% of East German prosecutors, their ranks by now almost 
completely purged of ex-Nazis, were instead members of East Ger-
many's Communist Party, the SED.12 
Are the Germans getting it right this time? Would the integration 
of socialist legal professionals i_nto East German public life indeed frus-
trate its renewal by obstructing the creation of a rule of law, which the 
integration of Nazi lawyers did not do in the case of the West German 
Federal Republic, or by preventing a reconciliation with the past, which 
the West German absorption of Nazi lawyers may well have done? I 
will try to answer this question by looking at East German law and law-
yers from the perspective of everyday socialist life. Much of what I will 
say in the following pages is based on court files and interviews from 
one small East German town that I shall call Liiritz: a county seat with 
about 55,000 inhabitants and a hinterland of villages and agricultural 
collectives. Despite its size and location, Liiritz was no backwater. it 
had a busy port, a large shipyard, several important factories, an engi-
neering academy, a sizable Soviet garrison, and, as the major town of 
the district, a Kreisgericht (District Court), which in 1988 employed 
five judges and handled an annual load of about 1000 cases. 
While my Liiritz findings do not provide a random sample of legal 
data on the GDR, we need not worry that they misdescribe everyday 
practice. East German policy put such a high premium on the "uni-
formity of the law" that great efforts were made to standardize judicial 
output across the entire country. Local judicial statistics were reported 
constantly to Berlin, even minor departures from the national average 
10. See Mfiu.ER, supra note 7, at 208. 
11. On the East Gennan replacement of fonner Nazi judges with Socialist judges, 
see HILDE BENJAMIN ET AL., ZUR GESCHICIITE DER REclrrSPFLEGE DER DDR 1945-1949, at 
71 (1976). 
12. SED stands for Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutsch/ands (Socialist Unity 
Party), the East Gennan Communist Party. See generally HILDE BENJAMIN ET AL., ZUR 
GESCHICIITE DER REclrrSPFLEGE DER DDR 1949-1961, at 66 (1980). 
2274 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 94:2270 
were commented on by superior courts and required explanation, and 
local case law deyiating from the norm was brought quickly back into 
line. But my Lilritz data, though most likely typical, are incomplete: 
they do not cover some of the most egregious miscarriages of justice 
that Westerners expect to find everywhere in socialist legal systems and 
that in East Germany happened primarily in certain settings. In Lilritz, 
as elsewhere in the GDR, politically touchy offenses were not investi-
gated by the regular police but by State Security and were not prose-
cuted before the local court but in the regional capital; in serious cases, 
before the second instance Regional Court (Bezirksgericht),· in lesser 
cases, before the capital's own and carefully staffed District Court. Po-
litical prisoners were detained in Stasi-prisons, again in the regional 
capital. What qualified as a "political" case would be determined by 
the regional prosecutor or the Regional Court director13 and changed 
over time. While in the second half of the 1980s, attempts to "flee the 
Republic," for example, appeared so ordinary that most cases were 
tried locally, even minor acts of civic defiance, such as placing a post-
card of Rosa Luxemburg with her famous "Freedom is always the free-
dom of those who think differently" into one's window, were consid-
ered threatening enough to be dealt with in the regional capital by 
judges and prosecutors specializing in such cases. 
Defendants tried before these special judges and panels - the "Ia-
panels" - did not on that account alone receive harsher sentences than 
those tried locally .. Someone caught while attempting to cross the bor-
der, for example, had to reckon with a much more severe penalty 
handed down by a Lilritz judge than a Rosa Luxemburg fan would re-
ceive in the regional capital. In fact, the group of defendants whose 
penalties, in Western eyes, were most out of proportion to their actual 
deeds - people accused of asocial and work-shy behavior, who often 
received lengthy prison sentences14 - in East German terms were not 
political offenders at all and routinely were tried before local courts. Of 
course, we would consider all these "offenses" political and would be 
13. The regional court, upon request of either the regional prosecutor or the court's 
own director, could assume jurisdiction over all criminal, civil, family, and labor law 
cases "if the significance, consequences or implications" of the case so warranted. Ge-
richtsverfassungsgesetz (Court Organization Act) of Sept 27, 1974, § 30, <JI 1, GESETZ-
BLATI DER DDR, Tun. I [GBl. I] 457 (G.D.R.) 
14. Under § 249 of the STRAFGESETZBUCH [StGB] (Criminal Code) of the GDR, 
"infringements of public order and security through asocial behavior" - mostly persis-
tent refusal of employment combined with petty property offenses and/or violations of 
child support obligations - could be punished with up to five years in prison. In LUritz, 
in 1979, the average penalty under§ 249 was 18 months in prison. By comparison, the 
overall average penalty, including sentences under § 249, was eight months in prison. 
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right to expect that, by our standards, political defendants were treated 
more harshly by. East German criminal law than others were.15 But 
whether that treatment was meted out by a "Ia" judge or by his local 
district court colleague depended largely on the perceived need for se-
crecy in these cases. "Embarrassing" offenses (and that could include 
anything from treason to writing a letter to a West German radio sta-
tion) went to the regional capital. "Ordinary" transgressions were dealt 
with at home. 
My Liiritz data thus exclude many of those incidents, whether mi-
nor or grave, that East German authorities were particularly eager to 
hide from Western view. But it must be remembered that they were also 
hidden from East German eyes. Ordinary citizens would learn of these 
incidents only through rumor. Ordinary judges or prosecutors would not 
be involved in their adjudication. Ordinary lawyers would, as a rule, not 
have "political" clients: the right to represent defendants before "Ia" 
panels was reserved to a small group of specially selected attorneys in 
which no Liiritz lawyer ever was included. And ordinary defendants 
were different from those whose political reticence would cause them to 
appear before a "Ia" judge in the regional capital. Most Liiritz defend-
ants belonged to the grumpy and reluctantly loyal majority in the GDR 
rather than to that tiny group of dissenters that only in the last few 
months and weeks of the GDR's existence reached any noticeable 
proportions. 
By drawing on Liiritz files and on interviews with Liiritz officials 
and citizens for my portrait of socialist legal professionals, I thus draw 
on legal experiences shared by most inhabitants of the GDR and should 
arrive at a more realistic likeness than those studies of socialist law and 
lawyers that take their cues only from the most visible and most outra-
geous socialist perversions of justice. How did East German jurists 
adapt to the judicial system they worked with? What hopes and fears, 
what instincts and habits were nurtured in their day-to-day legal lives? 
We cannot determine the proper place for former GDR lawyers in the 
capitalist present unless we know something about their socialist past. 
So our first question should be: who were these East German lawyers? 
* * * 
Unlike Western lawyers, who are jacks-of-all-trades and are pres-
ent wherever power and influence is wielded in capitalist countries, 
East German lawyers (like those of other East European states) were 
15_. See MARKovrrs. supra note 3, at 38. 
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not generalists, but trained to be specialists.16 After a common start, 
East Gennan law students were divided into two subgroups: future 
judges, attorneys and prosecutors followed the "justice" curriculum, 
while those meant to serve as legal counsel to the state-owned economy 
(Justiziare) followed the "economics" curriculum. Their specialization 
was reinforced by their· physical segregation: future judges and attor-
neys were trained at the Humboldt University in Berlin, future eco-
nomic lawyers at the universities of Halle and Leipzig, and future pros-
ecutors in Jena. Both curricula shared a heavy dose of ideological 
training: about one-third of total class hours. The more traditional law 
courses focused on doctrine rather than practice, with far more time 
spent on black-letter law than on clinical exercises. At least in later 
years, politically touchy subjects (such as crimes against the state) 
tended either to be glossed over or to be taught by special instructors 
brought in from the Stasi-Academy in Potsdam-Eiche. The segregation 
of political academics from ordinary professors encouraged a feeling of 
intellectual respectability among law teachers proper. 
On the whole, East Gennan legal training was job-oriented rather 
than scholarly. Only a few authorized law books - one in each field -
served as teaching texts: students were not to be confused with a multi-
tude of sources and views. Studies were highly structured, with many 
classes shared by students grouped by year of entry or common seminar 
attendance. Feelings of collectivity were strengthened by students' ac-
commodation in common residence halls, by their universal member-
ship in the Free Gennan Youth movement and their almost universal 
membership in the Communist Party, and by a superior teacher-student 
ratio than in West Gennan universities, which allowed for close and 
often friendly contacts Between students and instructors. All in all, the 
system was geared to produce reliable, cooperative, unselfish techno-
crats, trained in the application of state rules to that particular area of 
public endeavor for which they had specialized. Unlike capitalist law-
yers, East Gennan lawyers were not preoccupied with processes but 
with state-defined outcomes. 
Not surprisingly, as a professional group, they looked much more 
modest than their self-assured Western counterparts. East Gennan law 
graduates were younger than those coming from West Gennan universi-
ties: law studies lasted four years, but even with the obligatory military 
service or, for women, some sort of production work prior to university 
16. On the training of East German lawyers, see DANIEL JOHN MEADOR, IMPRES· 
SIONS OF LAW IN EAST GERMANY: LEGAL EDUCATION AND LEGAL SYSTEMS IN TiiE GERMAN 
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (1986); Inga Markovits, Book Review, 36 AM. J. COMP. L. 198 
(1988). 
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entry, one could be a judge or prosecutor by age 24. The GDR legal 
profession had m!IDY more female members than in the West: just over 
half of the East German judiciary, for example, was made up of wo-
men.17 Lawyers were much more likely to be of working-class back-
ground than in the West, 18 even though the official goal of proportional 
representation of all social classes in the judiciary was eventually aban-
doned and the term "class-background" could be subject to manipula-
tion. And they were far less affluent than in the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG): judges and prosecutors would make between DM 
1400 and DM 1600 (about $1000) a month before taxes,19 counsel to 
state-owned enterprises somewhat niore, and all three groups considera-
bly less than electricians or plumbers. With the exception of the attor-
neys (who were supposed to join some party though not necessarily the 
SED), virtually all jurists were Party members. Unlike West German 
judges who claim as part of their judicial independence the right- to 
come and go to work as they please, East German judges and prosecu-
tors had fixed working hours and were expected to remain in their of-
fices. They were not allowed to travel to the West, not allowed to have 
"West contacts" even by mail, not allowed to watch Western television, 
and many of them, if you ask them today, will tell you that they fol-
lowed these rules almost until the end. 
Only East German attorneys occasionally showed some of the fea-
tures we usually associate with capitalist lawyers. Maybe they were a 
little more aggressive, showing a little more freewheeling flair than 
their state-employed colleagues. Their group contained far fewer wo-
men than the three other subgroups of the East German legal profes-
sion20 and probably for reasons familiar to Western women: because, as 
one male lawyer suggested to me with a knowing smile, "women and 
mothers were not quite up to the pressures of success." Attorneys cer-
tainly were the biggest earners among East German lawyers. But even 
they made most of their money in that area of law that in the West 
17. On the feminization of the GDR 's legal profession and its continued impact in 
the new East German states, see Gisela Shaw, Juristinnen in den neuen Bundesliindern, 
15 ZEITSCHRIFf f'iiR REc:HrSSOZIOLOGIE 191 (1994). 
18. See Helmut Steiner; Social Origin and Structural Pattern of the Body of 
Judges in the GDR, 67 LAW & LEGIS. G.D.R. 49 (1967). 
19. My figures applied to Liiritz judges in 1980. For data reflecting somewhat 
lower payscales for trial court judges and prosecutors in 1975 (DM 1200 to DM 1430) 
see Andreas Gangel, Richter in der DDR - Wunschbild und Realitiitsausschnitte, in 
STEUER DER JUSTIZ IN DER DDR, supra note 2, at 395, 407. 
20. In 1980, 18.4% of all East German attorneys were women. See Hubert 
Rottleuthner, Das Ende der Fassadenforschung: Recht in der DDR (Tei[ 1), 15 ZEIT-
SCHRIFf f'iiR RECIITSSOZIOLOGIE 208, 236 (1994). 
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tends to be rather low-status: divorce law. It says something about the 
socialist legal profession if the same reason (women and children make 
unimpressive clients) that in the West contributes to the low status of 
family law in the East ensured the legal vitality of this kind of work: 
private quarrels between husbands and wives were far enough removed 
from issues of state importance to allow a lawyer the unabashed use of 
the tricks of his trade. Other East German legal professionals, by the 
way, would occasionally complain about the attorneys' unseemly inter-
est in money, and I don't think that it was only envy that caused them 
to gripe: they found the self-absorbed hunting for profit morally 
offensive. 
* * * 
How useful were socialist lawyers to the state or their clients? Let 
us begin with the judges. From its earliest days, adjudication in the 
GDR was seen as an exercise in political authority. Judges were func-
tionaries rather than watchmen, aligned with and dependent upon the 
state rather than charged to supervise its activities. Clashes between in-
dividual and government were not considered proper subjects for judi-
cial inquiry. The law should not stand between the socialist state and its 
citizens. Almost until the end, East German law thus knew no judicial 
review of administrative decisions, and when in December 1988, a half-
hearted reform finally introduced toothless review in a limited number 
of cases,21 the new law carefully avoided any confrontation between cit-
izen and government in the courtroom and defined the administration's 
role in the proceedings not as that of a "party" but only as that of a 
(supposedly aloof and benevolent) "participant. " 22 As in other East Eu-
ropean states, East Gerinan citizens could lodge informal complaints 
against their government and did so frequently and persistently. But the 
complaint process involved neither judges nor attorneys and was gov-
erned primarily by internal rules - a sometimes promising but essen-
tially "lawless" process. 23 
Even in situations in which East German citizens could sue the 
state - namely, in its proprietary role as landlord, employer, or pro-
21. A 1988 statute introducing judicial review ill a very limited number of cases 
came into force only on July 1, 1989, and remained totally ineffective. See Gesetz iiber 
die Zustiindigkeit und das Verfahren der Gerichte zur Nachpriifung von Verwaltungsent-
scheidungen of Dec. 14, 1988, GBl. I 327 (G.D.R.) [hereinafter NachpriifungsgesetzJ, 
22. See Nachpriifungsgesetz § 8, 'JI 2, GBl. I 327 (1988). 
23. On the workings of the East German complaint system see Inga Markovits, 
Rechtsstaat oder Beschwerdestaat? Verwaltungsrechtsschutz in der DDR, 31 RECIIT IN 
OST UND WFST 265 (1987). 
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vider of sales and services - they rarely did so. In the 1980s, only 
about seven perc~nt of the civil law suits in the Liiritz District Court in-
volved cases in which a citizen took some state-run store, trade organi-
zation, or the like to court. Most private litigation in the GDR was be-
tween citizens.24 And if East German citizens sued each other, a large 
proportion of cases would involve disputes over objects or objectiona-
ble types of behavior rather than money:25 personal quarrels between 
people living too close for comfort. In labor law, the vast majority of 
cases was not, as in the West, brought by employees against their em-
ployers but by employers against their negligent or undisciplined em-
ployees. In these suits, socialist managers would not look for financial 
redress but would seek to impress proper standards of a socialist work 
ethic upon the defendant and his or her fellow employees.26 
Compared to private litigation in capitalist countries, which mostly 
turns on money, East German civil litigation had lost much of its Midas 
touch. Instead, it concerned itself with social and interpersonal relation-
ships. Accordingly, East German judges would focus not so much on 
the efficient processing of private claims as on education and 
peacekeeping. They were expected to investigate thoroughly the social 
context of disputes and could do so at their own initiative. Even hear-
ings in minor civil cases, by West German standards, took very long: 
between one-half and one-and-one-half hours. Criminal cases might 
take even longer. "We started out with the primordial swamp," a judge 
once told me, by which she meant: we investigated a defendant's entire 
social career beginning from childhood. Even when dealing with the 
more unruly children of the system such as fugitives or people accused 
of "work-shy behavior," East German judges primarily seem to have 
seen themselves as educ·ators and social workers. 
In Bonn, Uwe-Jens Heuer, formerly a member of the GDR Acad-
emy of Sciences and now a deputy of the Party of Democratic Social-
ism (the SED's successor party), once called the East German political 
system "eine Erziehungsdikta~ur" ("a pedagogic dictatorship"), and 
24. In 1982, 66.8% of all plaintiffs and 93.3% of all defendants in first instance 
civil law disputes in the GDR were citizens. See UNPUBLISHED JUDICIAL STATISTICS OF 
THE GDR, FIRsT INSTANCE - CIVIL LAW 2 (1982). In LO.ritz, in the same year, 70.8% of 
all civil law litigation took place between citizens. 
25. In the LO.ritz District Court, out of 154 civil lawsuits in 1982, 31 % pursued the 
delivery or return of some object (e.g., apartment, garage, TV), 16% tried to induce cer-
tain kinds of behavior (e.g., primarily, to prevent undesirable behavior like noise, tres-
passing), and 53% asked for money (e.g., damages, rent payments, payment for sales or 
services). 
26. On the workings of East German social courts, see Inga Markovits, Pursuing 
One's Rights Under Socialism, 38 STAN. L. REv. 689, 701 (1986). 
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GDR judges were very much the products of that system: authoritarian, 
didactic, strict towards the obstinate and willful, lenient towards the re-
pentant and submissive, and, by Western standards, remarkably willing 
to assist the court's clients in their day-to-day troubles. Every Tuesday, 
during the court's "legal consultation" hours, judges gave free advice 
to countless citizens. They mediated between warring spouses or neigh-
bors, helped track down debtors of alimony or support obligations and 
saw to it that they paid, made sure victims of crimes received compen-
sation from their attackers, and always were available to collectives or 
social organizations in need of a speaker. As late as 1989, a Liiritz case 
file shows a judge not only securing overnight accommodation for an 
out-of-town plaintiff but even supplying him with the schedule of train 
connections that he had requested. Citizens expected such acts of practi-
cal assistance, and a responsible judge would not consider the tasks be-
neath her. They were part and parcel of her overall duties: to ensure or-
der, peace, discipline and collective cohesion. Unlike our judges, whom 
we think of as detached umpires between competing individual inter-
ests, socialist judges were political functionaries committed to asserting 
the parental authority of the state. 
Accordingly, judges in the GDR differed far less from prosecutors 
than they would in a Western democracy. To us, judges are neutral, and 
prosecutors are partisan. Under socialism, both judges and prosecutors 
were partisan: not to one of the parties before them but to the Party and 
its goals. They were distinguished by divisions of labor but not by dif-
ferent philosophies. Both were meant to uncover social malfunctionings 
and to devise those responses most in line with the current political 
fashion. Both the court and the prosecutor's office belonged, together 
with the city's "Interior Department," the police, and the local Stasi 
branch, to the so-called "security-forces" of a district, whose heads met 
once a month to discuss current problems of law and order: recent bor-
der violations, a case of arson, a rise in juvenile delinquency, or any 
other incident or trend disquieting to public peace or the authorities. 
Both cooperated beyond their daily casework: if, for instance, in the 
course of a divorce trial, the court learned of the husband's long-time 
unemployment, it might inform the prosecutor of the culprit's likely 
"parasitism." And both judges and prosecutors belonged to the same 
Party group at the courthouse. 
The cooperation sometimes led to rivalry. Both judges and prose-
cutors, sharing essentially similar tasks and the same superior (the Min-
istry of Justice), occasionally seem to have vied to show that each could 
do the job better than the other. In criminal cases, for instance, it was 
quite common for a judge to return the prosecutor's case "for further 
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investigation" - usually, to obtain some character reference from the 
defendant's work collective or to require some other evidence of collec-
tive involvement. As far as I can tell from my Luritz files, the practice 
never affected the eventual outcome of a case. But it showed the judge 
to be more conscientious about his job than his rival: one point chalked 
up for the judge, one gets the impression, in both protagonists' common 
pursuit of carefully tailored social control. There is also some evidence 
of tensions between judges and the local police, and the court's occa-
sional criticism of shoddy police work indirectly may have been aimed 
at the prosecutor's office, which supervised it. 
But if, essentially, judges and prosecutors were equals, the prose-
cutor was the more equal of the two. It was the prosecutor under whose 
leadership the district's "security forces" would meet to discuss the 
law-and-order concerns in their constituency. It was the prosecutor who, 
as a rule, served as Party Secretary at the courthouse. The assignment 
reflected the higher political status of prosecutors and the ranking of 
criminal law (the prosecutor's domain) over civil and family law (with 
which the prosecutor rarely would bother) in a legal system that saw 
law above all as an instrument of state control. 
In most cases, therefore, judges would follow the prosecutor's 
lead. Prosecutorial requests for arrest warrants, for example, almost al-
ways were honored by a judge. Since we have no overall statistics on 
this point, local figures must do. At the Lilritz District Court, for in-
stance, between 1982 and 1985, out of 559 applications for arrest war-
rants by local prosecutors, only one was denied by a judge. Reports 
from other courts show similar judicial compliance with prosecutors' 
requests.27 When, apparently alarmed by such figures, the GDR Minis-
try of Justice launched· several campaigns in 1987 and 1988 to en-
courage judicial resistance to unwarranted requests for a defendant's 
preliminary detention,28 the percentage of prosecutorial requests denied 
by Lilritz judges increased to no more than 4% in 1987 and 5% in 
1988. 
Judges showed similar deference to prosecutors in their sentencing 
practices. In Luritz in the 1980s, criminal law judges followed the prc;>s-
27. The director of the District Court Stralsund, for instance, reported at a district 
court directors' meeting in December 1987 that at his court "for the first time in years" 
a prosecutor's request for an arrest warrant had been rejected. 
28. To educate the judiciary about important policy developments and changes, the 
GDR Ministry of Justice or the Supreme Court would convene workshops and so-called 
"judges' conferences," at which representatives of the Ministry or the Court would 
spell out the policy in question and discuss its implications. One such conference deal-
ing with arrest warrants and issues of preliminary detention was a conference of district 
court directors on February 9-12, 1988, in Fuhlendorf. 
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ecutor's penalty suggestions in about 90% of all cases. As one judge 
told me, he and his colleagues were instructed by the superior court not 
to deviate from the prosecutor's proposal if the deviation would amount 
to no more than three months in prison - the implication being that a 
mere three months was not enough to warrant public confrontation be-
tween two representatives of socialist state authority. But since it took 
some pluck to defy the prosecutor's request, any deviation by more than 
three months also required more than ordinary backbone. A former re-
gional court judge, coming from one of the admittedly more exposed 
"Ia" panels that dealt with political offenses, once described to me the 
issue of whether to override the prosecutor's proposals in terms of a 
limited number of chips each judge had at his or her disposal. "You 
wanted to spend those chips very carefully," he said. As a result, most 
trials at which a judge departed from the prosecutor's suggested penalty 
resulted in only marginally different sentences. Complete acquittals 
were practically unheard of. If they deviated, judges often complied 
with the prosecutor's main request for punishment but differed on the 
fringes of a case: judges changed supplementary penalties (such as the 
obligation to work on community projects, for example), or, in the case 
of suspended sentences, altered the period of probation suggested by the 
prosecutor. Reading these cases today, one suspects that some of the de-
viations must have mattered more to the judge than to the defendant 
himself. Such small acts of judicial insubordination also may, at least in 
part, have been acts of self-assertion between two competitors: signal-
ing the judge's claim to professional respect without seriously challeng-
ing the basic solidarity between two colleagues. I once asked an attor-
ney to describe to me the relationship between judges and prosecutors 
in the GDR. "A scary a11iance" were the words he chose. 
Still, there were differences in emphasis. Both judges and prosecu-
tors shared the pedagogical convictions driving a particular decision. 
But if a judge rejected the prosecutor's penalty demands, she usually 
would do so in favor of the defendant. As in the case of old-fashioned 
parents, the judge, more likely to be a woman in any event, was also 
more likely to play the role of the mother: stem, yes, but more willing 
to find redeeming qualities in the offspring and at times more forgiving 
than the rigid and authoritarian father. 
Attorneys had to be outsiders in this family drama. The contrapun-
tal structure of Western procedure provides the defense counsel with a 
natural role and place: that of a counterweight to the prosecution. For-
mally, socialist procedure followed a similar pattern. Substantively, 
however, with judge and prosecutor firmly committed to the same so-
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cial purposes, the defense had no logical foothold in the scenario and 
only could appeal to both disciplinarians' parental generosity. 
· Especially in criminal cases, an attorney's procedural position was 
weak. Lawyers were entitled to visit their clients in prison and to have 
access to the record only after the prosecution had officially submitted 
its case to the court and the court had "opened" the proceedings. Dur-
ing preliminary investigations, an arrested suspect could see his lawyer 
only if the prosecutor consented.29 By their own account, prosecutors 
were in no hurry to do so until their case had been thoroughly prepared. 
But even if she allowed a pretrial visit, a former prosecutor once told 
me, attorneys usually would be in no hurry to meet with their clients. 
Nor did potential clients themselves appear eager to seek legal help. 
There is evidence that, at least in the 1980s, suspects were told of their 
right to retain a lawyer (usually on the day following their arrest)30 
when they were interrogated by an examining judge, who would record 
the prisoner's own version of events, perfunctorily investigate the rea-
sons for detention, and almost always sanction it. On that occasion, sus-
pects were also asked whom they wanted to be informed of their arrest. 
Most of those arrested in Liiritz named a relative. Many said: "No 
one." Nobody ever suggested that a lawyer be called. 
The "right to make use of an attorney at every stage of the pro-
ceedings," even though it existed on the books,31 held no sway in so-
cialist legal folklore. Had one ever suggested to them the need for 
Miranda-sty1e32 warnings, most protagonists in the East German legal 
process probably would have thought the idea absurd. If the police got 
hold of you, good for them and tough luck for you. Judging by the sus-
pects' own statements (attached to arrest warrants) and by the account 
of judges and prosecutors present in the process, most of those appre-
hended cooperated in their interrogation, conceded their deeds, admitted 
to the error of their ways, and hoped for the best. According to one 
prosecutor, fewer than 1 % of the suspects refused to testify. My Liiritz 
files support that estimate. Alth,ough upon interrogation by the examin-
ing judge, suspects would correct police reports on factual issues ("I 
did not need to break into the apartment because the door was un-
29. See STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [StPO] (Code of Criminal Procedure) § 64 (version 
of June 28, 1979), GBI. I 139 (G.D.R.). 
30. See StPO § 126, <JI 1 (1979), GBl. I 139. 
31. See StPO § 61, <JI 1 (1979), GBl. I 139. 
32. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court held that a 
person in custody has to be advised by the police of his right to remain silent, to consult 
with an attorney, to have an attorney appointed for him if he cannot afford one, and to 
be warned that any of his statements might be used against him. 
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locked"), they just as likely would volunteer information on transgres-
sions not yet uncovered by the police ("I also took a bicycle from the 
hallway"). As several judges told me: "The lying started only once a 
lawyer entered the stage." But since lawyers were rare participants in 
the East German criminal process, most suspects confronted their inter-
rogators with what appears to have been an honest mixture of fear, re-
spect, trust, and the wish to unburden their chests. 
Even once in court, East Germans would rarely use the services of 
an attorney. Under GDR procedure, representation by counsel was 
mandatory only in first-instance criminal trials before a regional court 
or in cases before the Supreme Court, that is, primarily in murder or 
treason cases.33 All other cases could be tried without a lawyer. There 
are no national figures on how many citizens chose representation any-
way. Official GDR statistics, although very thorough on other issues, 
apparently considered the participation of legal counsel too insignificant 
to warrant registration. According to my own data, in 1979, 15.3% of 
all civil litigants and 5.6% of all criminal defendants in Liiritz had hired 
a lawyer to represent them. Unlike Westerners, who would consider le-
gal help most indispensable in confrontations with as powerful an oppo-
nent as the state, East Germans apparently found lawyers more useful in 
areas removed from state authority. Towards the end of the GDR, grow-
ing disaffection with the system seems to have led its citizens to a 
greater appreciation of attorneys: by 1988, in Liiritz 21.1 % of all civil 
parties and 16% of all criminal defendants were represented in court. 
But East German legal officials remained suspicious of attorneys until 
the very end. Although in all other criminal or civil cases judges could 
order representation for parties or defendants unable to represent them-
selves effectively,34 they·virtually never did so. Children and the handi-
capped, who needed some representation though not necessarily by an 
attorney,35 almost always were assigned social workers rather than law-
yers to assist them. "Who needs a lawyer anyway?" East German legal 
officials seem to have thought.36 Many of them remembered a slogan 
taught in law school: "The best attorney is the judge." 
33. See StPO § 63, <JI l (1979), GBl. I 139. 
34. See StPO § 63, <JI 1 (1979), GBI. I 139 (stating that defense counsel should be 
appointed "if the issue requires it"); ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] (Code of Civil Proce-
dure) (1975), GBI. I 533 (G.D.R.) (stating that the court shall appoint a "procedural 
representative" for a minor or handicapped defendant without legal guardian, or for any 
party unable "to intelligibly participate in the proceedings"). 
35. See StPO § 72 (1979), GBI. I 139. 
36. Consider one example: a 1982 Liiritz case involving an appeal against a tort 
award resulting from a car accident The appellant, an insolvent father of four children 
who at the time of the appeal was serving a prison sentence, asked for the assignment 
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Compare this attitude to GDR practices in labor litigation, where 
the representation of workers by union counsel or the participation of 
union or workplace delegates in the proceedings was common.37 But 
union representatives differed from lawyers in significant ways. Al-
though they received some labor law training, they were neither legal 
professionals nor intellectuals. And instead of one-sided loyalty towards 
their clients, they owed loyalty to both the worker and the work collec-
tive. This ambiguity, confusing and suspicious to a Westerner, re-
deemed the work of union counsel in East German eyes. To socialists, 
attorneys in civil law cases represented private, and very likely egotisti-
cal, interests; worse yet, defense attorneys operated as apologists for of-
fensive and self-seeking antisocial behavior. But labor law representa-
tives embodied collective concern for what happened at the workplace 
and thus could speak up for their fellow worker without having to fear 
the disapproval of a legal system suspicious of all manifestations of 
self-interest. And they could also, as they frequently did, speak out 
against a worker-plaintiff or worker-defendant. No wonder that their 
participation in labor law cases was thought important enough to be re-
corded by East German judicial statistics.38 
A criminal defense counsel, by comparison, had to watch his steps. 
As one Lilritz lawyer described it, his "spectrum of possible options 
was narrow." Asking for an acquittal was rare and could be a risky 
strategy. Demanding a milder sentence than suggested by the prosecu-
tion was common but frequently ineffective; some attorneys would not 
even try and instead simply seconded the prosecution's proposal. We 
should not rush to condemn such strategies: as files occasionally show, 
the prosecutor too (swayed, perhaps, by the defense counsel's presenta-
tion of the case?) may have intended to let the defendant off lightly. 
One 1988 decision of my Lilritz District Court, for instance, in which 
the defendant in a fraud case had been sentenced to nineteen months in 
prison because "both prosecutor and defense counsel agreed that only a 
significant deprivation of freedom could be expected to successfully re-
of an attorney to argue his case before the Regional Court: The Regional Court rejected 
the request "since obviously, the appellant has other options for asserting his rights ei-
ther himself or with the assistance of other persons." 
37. In 1982, out of 12,323 district court labor law proceedings in the GDR, 14% 
involved the participation of union counsel, 44% the participation of union representa-
tives providing collective input into the deliberations, and 12% involved both union 
counsel and union representatives. See UNPUBLISHED JUDICIAL STATISTICS OF THE GDR 
- FlRsT INSTANCE, LABOR LAW 24 (1982). 
38. In 1982, attorneys were involved in 8% of all district court labor law cases. 
See id. Presumably, those data were of official interest, since attorneys were perceived 
as competitors to the more numerous, and ideologically favored, union representatives. 
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educate the offender," was promptly quashed by the Regional Court 
and replaced wi~ a thirty-month term: supposedly, the lower court had 
underestimated the gravity of the offense. The example shows how de-
fense attorneys may have had to resort to devious tactics to undercut the 
severity of socialist criminal law without appearing to challenge its 
authority. 
Often it was more promising to try to gain victories at the periph-
ery of a case: for example, attack monetary sanctions slapped onto a 
criminal penalty. Defense counsel would routinely depict their clients in 
the rosiest light and dwell on their likely rehabilitation. But their main 
function, as several criminal lawyers have told me, was to offer "pas-
toral help": cheer people up, serve as liaison between the defendant and 
his relatives, help with the domestic problems caused by someone's ar-
rest, provide a shoulder to lean on. Only in areas further removed from 
state authority like civil or family law - a lawyer's main bread and 
butter in any event - could GDR lawyers officially display some of 
that argumentativeness and aggressiveness for which Western lawyers 
are famous and infamous. 
Where does that leave us? With a legal profession that unlike its 
Western counterpart was not united by a common belief in individual 
autonomy, the legitimacy of conflict, the sanctity of procedure, or even 
by a common style. The East German legal profession showed little 
professional cohesion. Although judges and prosecutors cooperated dur-
ing working hours,. they rarely socialized. Attorneys not only did not 
privately interact with their colleagues from the courthouse, they even 
claim that such interaction was frowned upon by the Party. When I 
asked them about their circle of friends, many GDR jurists took care to 
point out that it did not include other legal professionals. Nor were East 
German lawyers held together by that common professional language 
that signals membership in a particular vocation and excludes outsiders 
from its interactions. There was no such language, no real "legalese" in 
the GDR: socialist law, intendipg to educate and to steer its addressees 
towards socially useful goals, had to remain simple and accessible. 
Lawyers' briefs used the language of the common man. Judges and 
prosecutors were admonished constantly to make themselves understood 
by everyone in the courtroom. The participation of so many lay people 
in the East German legal process - members of social courts, lay as-
sessors, representatives of the collective - reinforced the simple and 
straightforward quality of East German law-talk. It also helped to blur 
the line between lawyers and nonlawyers even further. "We were noth-
ing special," an East German judge once told me. So why search for 
special contacts with others equally unremarkable? Although virtually 
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all East German jurists belonged to the Vereinigung demokratischer 
Juristen der DDR. ("Association of Democratic Lawyers"), membership 
seems to have existed mainly on paper. As one lawyer put it: "Oh, 
them; all they ever did was pass out red armbands. " 39 It was only after 
the Wende that professional association became meaningful to East Ger-
man lawyers: today in Liiritz, attorneys, judges and prosecutors regu-
larly convene over glasses of beer in a local restaurant, and attorneys 
will even travel out of town for meetings of the Bar Association. 
* * * 
To summarize up to this point: the East German legal profession 
was staffed by people quite unlike those we usually encounter in West 
Germany's legal landscape. Moreover, the legal process itself differed 
in significant ways from the legal process we know. I want to list only 
some of those differences that, I believe, had the greatest impact on the 
intellectual and psychological make-up of East German legal profes-
sionals and their clients. 
To begin with the written word: the East German legal process was 
influenced by legal texts looking singularly nonlegal to Western readers. 
In our law world, written documents play an important role: they fix 
events in the past and remove them from legal dispute, facilitate proof, 
allow for greater precision than spontaneous oral communications, and 
streamline the legal process by replacing time-consuming palavers in 
court with the speedy exchange of briefs. The East German legal pro-
cess, too, was deeply buried under paper. But most of those texts did 
not, like ours, aim for the indisputable assertion of rights but instead 
served autocratic purposes: demands for loyalty coming from above 
(expressed in the endless stream of guidelines, standpoints, concepts, di-
rectives, and the like) and assurances from below that everything was 
indeed proceeding according to Party wishes (such as evaluations and 
self-evaluations, summaries of meetings, local progress reports, etc.). 
These documents were not precise and to the point but often ex-
traordinarily long-winded and florid: ritually repeating the most recent 
Party line for pages on end until finally, almost as an afterthought, the 
document's specific purposes would be mentioned ("You've got to read 
them starting at the back," a Party Secretary once advised me). Much 
of the vocabulary was political rather than legal, with already ambigu-
ous terms changing their importance and meaning in line with the twists 
and turns of political developments. Many of the written exchanges be-
39. See Howard de Nike, Die Vereinigung demokratischer Juristen in der DDR. 
Ein Modell der Professionalisierung?, 14 GESCIDCHfE UND GEGENWART 139, 143 (1995). 
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tween central and local authorities served to collect information in a so-
ciety that could n9t rely on the open word; hence, for instance, the con-
stant demands for Wochenmeldungen (reports on weekly events, which 
every East German court had to submit, usually by Tuesday, to its supe-
rior court), statistics, evaluations, and progress reports. But given the 
loose and loaded political terminology, success stories were easy to 
fabricate. Moreover, the socialist obsession with secrecy removed even 
potentially meaningful information (like statistics) from public use.40 An 
East German judge once, jokingly, translated for me the frequently used 
classification "nur fiir den Dienstgebrauch" ("for internal use only") 
as "vor dem Lesen vernichten" ("destroy before reading") - the ulti-
mate condemnation of the communicative value of these texts. In the 
East German legal process, the written word, the traditional weapon of 
Western lawyers, had lost much of its power, and whatever power it re-
tained was in most instances wielded by the Party. 
As a corollary to this development, oral communications had 
gained in breadth and significance, but, again, with different functions 
than in the West. In capitalist legal systems, oral proceedings are meant 
to ensure authenticity and to enable those involved in a dispute to have 
their say. They are linked closely to our demand for publicity, which 
aims for the democratic control of the legal process: if ordinary citizens 
can watch and listen to what is going on in the courtroom, those in a 
position of authority will not get away with misusing their powers. 
In East German law, the oral character of many interactions served 
other purposes. It was meant to facilitate the participation of non-
professionals: social courts, for instance, staffed entirely with lay-
people, decided most first-instance labor disputes and many petty civil 
and criminal matters in the GDR and by their very nature relied on oral 
and informal transactions, with only very rudimentary written summa-
ries available for later review and with a happy-go-lucky approach to 
procedure that encouraged digressions by the judges and interference by 
the spectators. 41 Many communications were oral so that they would 
leave no trace, such as Party deliberations preceding important deci-
sions, or instances of that infamous "telephone justice." At times, writ-
40. Both East Gennan judicial statistics and the only Supreme Court case law col-
lection published since 1977, the lnformationen des Obersten Gerichts der DDR (Su-
preme Court Infonnations), were classified "nur fiir den Dienstgebrauch" ("for internal 
use only") and were distributed on a need-to-know basis. Although the classification 
"nur fiir den Dienstgebrauch" was abolished on January 1, 1988, sensitive instructions 
by the Ministry of Justice continued to be labeled "Dienstsache" (official matter) and 
were numbered, and thus presumably distributed in restrictive fashion. 
41. On East Gennan social courts, see Markovits, supra note 26, at 701. 
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ten law issued at the top levels of government would be transformed 
into oral law at lower levels: for example, politically sensitive instruc-
tions by the Supreme Court or the Ministry of Justice might be read by 
a high official to lower court judges convened in so-called "judges' 
conferences" that served to disseminate new policies to those who were 
to apply them in the field and at which participants only took notes. 
And, most importantly, communications were oral because the peda-
gogic purposes of socialist law called for direct and vigorous persua-
sion, difficult to achieve in written texts. For instance, at trials before a 
"selected public," the public was not invited to monitor the proceed-
ings but carefully chosen to include those most in need of the moral and 
practical lessons a case had to offer. The technique was said to be espe-
cially effective in rent collection cases, to which the court would invite 
an audience of other delinquent tenants living in the same apartment 
block as the defendant. On such occasions, it could happen that some- of 
the invitees felt sufficiently persuaded or pressured by the legal moral-
ity play unfolding before their eyes to pay their own rent debts right 
then and there in the courtroom. A flyer, say, publicizing the court's de-
cision among all defaulting tenants of a housing project, probably 
would not have had the same result. 
Reliance on oral communications in a political system bent on 
Party discipline was not without its costs. Oral communications are dif-
ficult to hold to a previous game plan and difficult to check up on after-
wards. As early as 1957, an inspector charged with investigating the 
performance of a regional court complained to the Ministry of Justice 
about the tendency of judges to base too much of their activities "on 
talks across their desks," a practice that "undermines control and self-
control and lures people into somewhat haphazard work habits." I have 
been told of cases in which the Party's reliance on the spoken word 
backfired in strange fashion: as for instance in a politically touchy 1988 
criminal trial in Liiritz, at which a judge from the regional Bezirks-
gericht, sent to make sure that. everything went according to plan, had 
been instructed to dictate the District Court's judgment. The Liiritz 
judge, furious, rejected the suggestion, and when she stuck to her guns, 
the inspector abandoned his mission and let her have her way - with 
the tacit understanding that neither would let the Regional Court Direc-
tor know that it was not her emissary who had drafted the verdict. 
Despite such pitfalls, reliance on face-to-face communications was 
indispensable to a legal system hoping to change the character of man. 
East German legal officials were great believers in Aussprachen, a term 
for which I can find no English equivalent. The usual translation -
"talk" or "conversation" - conveys nothing of the heart-to-heart seri-
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ousness by which an Aussprache would try to lead anyone deviating 
from the accepted norm (a rebellious judge, a prosecutor contemplating 
divorce, a first offender not yet hardened into a criminal) back into the 
fold. Aussprachen were undertaken in and out of courtrooms; in per-
sonal matters and in those of public concern; before a case went to trial 
and after it had been decided; by judges, prosecutors, bosses, Party 
functionaries, or administrators. Occasionally, the possibility of defus-
ing a conflict by way of an Aussprache was mentioned in a code. 42 
Mostly, Aussprachen were undertaken without specific statutory author-
ization. They were extralegal attempts to resolve disputes by tapping 
into individual and collective human resources. The proximity between 
speaker and spoken-to was meant to provide an occasion for a culprit to 
confide in his interrogator, air personal problems, wake up to his obli-
gations towards society, allow a person with authority and experience to 
steer him in the right direction, and, if possible, involve collective help-
ers in the task. Whatever this method of dispute resolution gained in 
human warmth did not come cheaply. In all Aussprachen, the oral char-
acter of the interaction facilitated overbearing or misuse of authority (no 
outsider with clout was usually present to check it) and excluded most 
violations of individual rights from later review (since Aussprachen vir-
tually never left a record). 
A third feature of socialist law, linked with the previous one, was 
its highly personal character. A legal system aiming for collective 
warmth rather than cold efficiency is much more dependent on the 
human qualities of its personnel than one that contents itself with the 
technical processing of claims. Whether an Aussprache, for instance, 
would do its job depended at least in part on the pedagogic talents of 
the official engaged in it: imaginative and tactful advice might defuse a 
conflict that authoritarian righteousness would only harden. Since Aus-
sprachen usually left no trace, we can only guess at what went on in 
them. But a few files on predivorce Aussprachen at the Liiritz court-
house that for some reason wer~ recorded in the 1960s suggest that per-
sonal attributes, such as the gender of the official trying to talk a couple 
out of a divorce, had much to do with his or her evaluation of the mar-
riage conflict. While the Liiritz court secretary, at the time a woman, 
tended to focus on aspects favorable to the wife, the family-law judge, 
at the time a man, was much more likely to acknowledge grievances of 
the husband. 
42. See ZPO § 28, 'JI 2 (1975), OBI. I 533 (G.D.R.), under which a plaintiff could 
be asked for an Aussprache in court, in the course of which he could be encouraged to 
alter, amend, or "if so warranted" withdraw his claim. None of this was mandatory. 
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With private characteristics exerting so much influence over an of-
ficial's public performance, it is not surprising that the East German ad-
ministration of justice placed great emphasis on the personal behavior 
of judicial cadres. When in 1982 a Liirltz judge contemplates divorce, 
the court's "weekly report" advises the Ministry of Justice of the fact. 
When, six years later, personal quarrels erupt in the prosecutor's office, 
the Ministry of Justice sends several officials to Liiritz who in nine 
Aussprachen try to soothe hurt feelings and to restore collective peace. 
When in the same year, one of the Liiritz junior judges, in an dispute 
over a garage, sues his antagonist, the court's director simply strikes the 
complaint from the docket. "A judge does not sue," she tells her col-
league. A socialist role model does not engage in the petty pursuit of 
self-interest. 
East German court files mirror this personalized approach to so-
cialist justice. If West German civil records reveal dry and methodic 
records interspersed with receipts, balance sheets, affidavits, photo-
copies and the like, East German civil court files tell straightforward 
human-interest stories. Since most complaints are either written or dic-
tated by the parties themselves, they echo the passions of immediate ex-
perience. Divorce complaints are documented with lengthy personal 
confessions. Civil law suits tell tales of private woes. Even the lawyers 
join in the emotional fray. "The plaintiff considers it an outrage," a 
Liiritz attorney writes in his brief. "The defendant is deeply pained to 
hear," his colleagu.e on the opposite side replies. Exclamation marks 
abound. 
The personal style matches a litigation process that seemed con-
sumed with family-style quarrels. Since in the GDR neither complaints 
against administrative decisions nor contract disputes within the state-
owned economy could be pursued in court, the judicial stage, as we 
have seen,43 was largely left to citizens suing each other. In doing so, 
East German plaintiffs and defendants defied the capitalist experience 
that people closely acquainted .with each other try to avoid confronta-
tions in court. On the contrary, human proximity in the GDR seems to 
have been a stimulus for litigation. People sued each other not despite 
their closeness but because of it. They got into fights, I think, because 
life under socialism left so little room for personal escapes. In Liiritz, 
for instance, in the 1980s, almost 60% of all civil litigation among citi-
zens took place between parties who once had been married, had cohab-
ited, were related to each other, or lived in the same house. If litigation 
erupted over the ownership or use of things, the objects of contention 
43. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
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often were fought over not because of their monetary value but because 
of the human input they embodied: a car for which the purchaser had 
spent over a decade on the waiting list, or an allotment garden that had 
consumed many hours of labor. Even claims for money seemed more 
personal than under capitalism: in Liiritz, in 1988, 70% of all monetary 
claims enforced in civil court did not originate in commercial ex-
changes on the market, but in private deals between private citizens, or 
were not based on exchange relationships at all, such as personal injury 
or inheritance claims. While West German civil litigants tend to keep at 
arm's length from each other, East German litigants seemed engaged in 
a kind of personal clinch. 
And, finally, a fourth feature of the socialist legal process, much 
made of these days and most offensive to Westerners, was its embed-
dedness in a tight, hierarchical command structure. The previous pages 
have provided many examples. East German legal officials were always 
dependent upon those above them. Contrary to common West German 
beliefs, most interventions would not come from outside Party function-
aries: telephone calls from the local Party Secretary were, at least in 
theory, frowned upon by the system since they sidestepped central au-
thorities and allowed for deviations and cover-ups. "Telephone justice" 
of this sort could be resisted (even if it not always was). Instead, the 
telephone call most likely to ring an alarm bell in a lower court judge's 
mind ("What did I do wrong?") would come from the superior regional 
court. Like any other aspect of socialist government, the judiciary, too, 
was controlled by the principle of "democratic centralism": local 
judges had to report and were responsible to the regional courts (and ul-
timately the Supreme Court), which in turn supervised and directed the 
work of local courts. Regular inspections by teams of full-time court re-
visors made sure that the instructions from higher levels were carried 
out below. If individual judges too persistently departed from the party 
line (a few and well-spaced deviations might be tolerated), they would 
be first admonished by their co:urt's director and later, if need be, called 
in by the regional court and given a talking-to. The system ensured that 
GDR judges usually knew what was expected of them. 
But it was a far more ambiguous and contradictory system of judi-
cial control than Westerners usually will allow. East German legal doc-
trine never renounced the concept of "judicial independence" pro-
claimed in the GDR Constitution.44 Judges were not to be told how to 
decide individual cases, and if they were, it was possible to resist that 
44. DIE VERFASSUNG DER DDR (Constitution) art. 96, <JI 1 (G.D.R.) (as amended on 
Oct. 7, 1974). 
June 1996] Post-Socialist Germany 2293 
kind of crude and unveiled interference, at least in later years. But they 
were meant to get their answers "right": not to find fair solutions by 
impartially applying formal rules to some private dispute of concern 
only to the participants, but to find the politically correct solutions to 
social ills whose diagnosis and remedy usually had already been pre-
scribed by the Party. 
Only a legal system that does not claim to know all the answers 
(and therefore does not favor one prospective outcome over another) 
can place its faith in procedural justice. Socialist law believed in sub-
stantive justice: it knew the answers (even if those answers changed 
over time) and therefore had to make sure that each individual judge 
would find them. Hence the innumerable instructions, analyses, inspec-
tions and consultations constantly keeping judges abreast of the current 
political line. The Party, in this scheme of things, was the medical au-
thority on all social ills. The judge was the local practitioner treating 
the patient. The responsibility - according to the official claim - re-
mained his or hers in each individual case. The GDR Ministry of Jus-
tice's official catalogue of the qualities required in future judges thus 
listed both "political steadfastness and an unfaltering commitment to-
wards the Party" and a character trait likely to undermine that commit-
ment: "Zivilcourage"45 - the courage to speak up in the face of 
authority. 
It was an attempt to square the circle. The Party wanted to have its 
cake and eat it too:. have a self-confident, vigorous, authoritative judici-
ary, yet be assured that it would always toe the line. East German 
judges and prosecutors accepted the contradictions without visible com-
plaints. "Judicial independence is a constitutional principle," the Lfuitz 
court director, for instance, noted in her diary at an October 1983 judi-
cial workshop convened to study the lessons of the Eleventh Party Con-
gress. "A judge enjoys a high degree of autonomy. Judicial decision-
making, too, is governed by the primacy of politics." And, three years 
later, at a meeting for district court directors, she jotted down this 
formula: "Unity of democratic centralism, individual responsibility, and 
judicial independence." "Important," she added in the margin of her 
notebook. I cannot imagine how the words could have made sense to 
her. But as far as I can tell, most East German judges, like she, did not 
question the fundamental inconsistency of their instructions but did 
their best to fulfill both demands of their job: act out their limited, case-
45. See Anforderungen an die Absolventen der Sektion Rechtswissenschaft der 
Humboldt-Universitiit zu Berlin of Febr. 22, 1987, cited in Gangel, supra note 19, at 
400. 
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by-case independence and render decisions in line with current political 
priorities. They felt both burdened by the constant obligation to get it 
right ("always this pressure from above," one judge confided) and 
grateful for the advice and guidance of their superiors ("I always 
thought that consultations were helpful," another judge said). 
One way to deal with the dilemma was servility. Another was posi-
tivism: East German judges liked to stick closely to the letter of the law 
since it could be trusted to reflect authoritative Party positions and, at 
the same time, provided shelter against interferences from the outside. 
Many judges seem to have played it by ear, stressing their "indepen-
dence" when possible and their political loyalty when necessary. Those 
who truly believed in socialism may have found it easiest to juggle their 
conflicting tasks: sharing the Party's ultimate belief in substantive jus-
tice seems to have given socialist functionaries the confidence to inter-
pret official goals with greater creativity and authority. But most judges, 
over years of navigating the treacherous currents of democratic central-
ism, must have developed habits, or at least pretenses, of obedience dis-
tasteful not only to Westerners but also, possibly, to themselves.46 
At times, it seemed as if East German authorities, too, were dissat-
isfied with the subservience their own orders and monitoring practices 
had bred. Interspersed with criticism of judges who did not toe the line, 
one finds criticism of those who toed it too readily. Especially in the 
1980s, directives from above encouraged GDR judges to show more 
spiritedness and self-reliance: reject unjustified applications for arrest 
warrants by the prosecutor, for instance, or more often appoint legal 
counsel for defendants needing help. Instructions like these were taken 
down duly in judges' diaries at workshops and conferences. But can in-
dependence be ordered from above, especially by authorities who 
tended to take with the left hand what the right had given? Instead, I 
believe, most GDR judges and prosecutors looked for meaning where 
unambiguous meaning could be found more easily and identified with 
46. Occasionally, one catches glimpses of such self-disdain. The Luritz files, for 
instance, contain a 1986 petition of one of the court's former directors, now legal coun-
sel to a state-owned enterprise, in which she asks the GDR Council of State, and its 
Chairman, Erich Honecker, to overrule the local denial of a travel visa to West Ger-
many to attend a parent's eighty-fifth birthday. Since East German judges and prosecu-
tors were not allowed to have any "contacts" with the West, the writer, during her time 
on the bench, had broken off relations with her family members in the Federal Repub-
lic. In her letter to Honecker, she confesses to being ashamed of her compliance. 
"Sometimes, when thinking back on the meaning of our lives, we think that we have 
lost respect for ourselves," she writes of herself and her husband. Her petition is de-
nied, because the "no-contact rule" applied not only to current, but also to former 
officeholders. 
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the caring aspects of their work: their tasks to educate the ignorant and 
faltering, protect the weaker party, keep the peace, see to it that every-
one had a job and a roof over his head. 
* * * 
What follows for the attitudes of East German lawyers toward that 
central element of our legal faith: our respect for legal forms and proce-
dures? Leaving aside the "antiformalism" and "antineutralism" of its 
earlier years, the East German legal system, throughout most of its his-
tory, stressed the importance of legal order and discipline. Law was the 
Party's blueprint for building socialist society and had to be carried out 
religiously. "Socialist legality" was defined as the "strict observance of 
the law combined with Party spirit" (again, the attempt to square the 
circle), and while the "Party spirit" introduced uncertainty and manipu-
lability into the equation, the "strict observance of the law" was some-
thing socialist legal officials could hold onto. East German judges and 
prosecutors were taught to work in an orderly manner and with care, to 
investigate each case thoroughly and to follow exactly prescribed proce-
dures. If local courts occasionally got their signals wrong and slipped 
(no wonder, given the fundamental inconsistency of the official de-
mands for both precision and partisanship), regional courts (who, as a 
Luritz judge put it, could be "real sticklers for form") would usually 
call them to order. Regular court inspections from above made sure that 
everyone at the trial court level followed the rules. Reports of such in-
spections provide detailed, even finicky, accounts of the inspected 
judges' compliance, or lack thereof, with whatever provisions governed 
their work. 
But the East German regard for rules lacked jurisprudential convic-
tion. Initially, the observation of legal formalities was clearly not more 
than a cover-up meant to deflect West German criticism of East German 
perversions of justice: as when in a 1954 show trial, the GDR Prosecu-
tor General criticized defense attorneys for "not having posed a single 
question throughout the entire proceedings," which ended with a death 
penalty for economic subversion and would have done so whatever the 
efforts of the defense.47 By the early 1970s, when East Germany, like 
other socialist countries, turned to the law as a means of ensuring eco-
nomic and social progress, formality began to be respected as order: 
laws had to be strictly obeyed because the Party behind them had said 
47. See Falco Werkentin, Die Strafjustiz im politischen System der DDR: 
Fundstiicke zur Steuerungs- und Eingriffspraxis des zentralen Parteiapparates der SED, 
in STEUERUNG DER JUSTIZ IN DER DDR, supra note 2, at 93, 111. 
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so. But socialists never believed that the impartial observation of legal 
rules might produce justice. To them, procedure determined the se-
quence of steps by which a particular enterprise should be carried out 
- a timetable rather than a summary of the rules of the game. In par-
ticular, East German legal officials did not see procedure as a method 
of allotting strategic advantages to two warring parties that required an 
even distribution of bonus points to ensure fairness of outcome. While 
judges and prosecutors were taught to observe procedural requirements 
carefully, I suspect that they saw no real point to them. And was there? 
For example, to judge by the files, East German judges, when signing 
arrest warrants, took care to inform the suspect of his right to lodge a 
complaint. But almost nobody did, and even if someone was tenacious 
enough to follow up on the advice, it virtually never seems to have 
made any difference.48 Not surprisingly, GDR courts were very forgiv-
ing of missed deadlines and the like, and almost any excuse would do 
to change the date of a hearing. Why not, judges seem to have thought. 
They attributed no great significance to these matters. 
Take the East German attitudes towards defense attorneys. As we 
have seen, their position in criminal trials was weak. The system per-
ceived no structural need for their services; no urge to achieve a proce-
dural equilibrium by balancing the weight of the prosecution against the 
counterweight of the defense. Some judges and prosecutors seem to 
have felt something close to contempt for defense attorneys. "I never 
really saw what they got their money for," one Liiritz judge told me. 
The same judge, incidentally, had prevented a defense lawyer from us-
ing a dictaphone, obtained with great difficulties by way of Sweden, to 
record information from the files of a client to which the attorney, as 
usual, had access only on the premises of the courthouse. I am sure that 
it did not occur to this judge that her interdiction might weaken the 
likelihood that the truth about that particular client's offense would 
emerge at the trial. Were not she and the prosecutor there to examine 
the matter fully? 
Attorneys were especially unwelcome in situations involving en-
counters between citizen and state. If in a civil dispute between private 
people one or the other party hired a lawyer to represent solely his or 
her interests in court, the inevitable one-sidedness of the lawyer's argu-
ments might put into question their validity but could be tolerated by 
the system because, after all, the issue mattered more to the disputants 
than to the state. But confrontations between citizen and state were an-
48. For example, in Liiritz in 1987 out of a total of 126 arrest warrants issued, 23 
were challenged by complaints to the Court of Appeals, none of them successfully. 
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other matter. Socialism did not like individual challenges to state au-
thority. It liked even less for such challenges to be articulated and 
sharpened by professional squabblers. I noted already that attorneys 
played a lesser role in East German criminal procedure than in civil 
cases.49 They played virtually no role at all in administrative matters. 
Without judicial review, they lacked, for one thing, the proper stage to 
parade their talents: the courtroom. But even nonforensic lawyering ap-
peared suspicious to GDR authorities if it pitted a citizen against his 
government. Attorneys were not supposed to assist clients with applica-
tions for an exit visa, for example. They were not supposed to help citi-
zens draft complaints against the administration. When in 1986 a Berlin 
woman used the services of her attorney to submit a petition to the 
Minister of Justice, she caused a minor uproar in the Ministry, and the 
file made its way all the way up to the Minister himself. "This is not 
what I imagine to be a lawyer's proper role," a high official noted in 
the margins of the lawyer's brief. "Yes," the Minister himself added 
approvingly. 
No intermediary should come between the citizen and the parental 
state.50 It is no accident that East German attitudes towards criminal 
procedure resemble American pre-Gault51 views of the juvenile justice 
system: ranking the court's "care and solicitude,"52 and, if necessary, 
punishment and control, as more beneficial to a defendant than the ma-
nipulative services of a lawyer. Even those former judges or prosecutors 
who speak with respect of a particular attorney do not appear to have 
seen him as a legitimate opponent to be reckoned with. One Liiritz 
prosecutor, for example, mentioned with pleasure the rare spunk and 
belligerence of one of the local attorneys. Did his combativeness 
achieve more for his client than the more typical cautious defense of the 
other lawyers, I asked. "No, not really," the prosecutor replied. "But it 
made for a more thrilling trial." 
49. See StPO § 63, Cj[ 1 (1979), GBl. I 139 (G.D.R.); supra text accompanying 
note 33. 
50. The tenn was coined by HAROLD J. BERMAN. JUSTICE IN THE U.S.S.R.: AN INTER-
PRETATION OF SOVIET LAW 282 (rev. ed. 1963). 
51. In its decision In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), the U.S. Supreme Court rejected 
the parental infonnality of the American juvenile justice process as well-meaning but il-
lusory and insisted instead that juvenile defendants, like adults, were in need of, and en-
titled to, the basic constitutional protections of due process. 
52. Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 120 (1909) (artic-
ulating the hopes of early refonners for a warm and parental juvenile justice system). 
The phrase is cited, almost nostalgically, by the Supreme Court in Gault, 387 U.S. at 
15. 
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Not all GDR jurists viewed procedure with equal cynicism. But 
most, I believe, respected legal formality, if at all, for its surface quali-
ties: as decoration, as the caprice of one's superior, as a hoop to jump 
through; at best, as a schedule ensuring the orderly execution of one's 
tasks. Although many lawyers took obvious pride in their professional 
skills and liked to get their i's dotted and t's crossed, one gets the im-
pression of aesthetic pleasure rather than of philosophical commitment. 
Few, it seems to me, saw formality as a sine qua non of justice. I re-
member a conversation with the former director of a regional court 
about a lengthy lawsuit between two neighbors over the height of a 
hedge between their gardens. The case had originated in Liiritz, had 
traveled back and forth between the Liiritz District Court and the Re-
gional Court of Appeals, and after several years (and, as I knew from 
other sources, after the pulling of Party and Stasi strings) had been de-
cided by Supreme Court cassation. My conversation partner was clearly 
annoyed at the outcome of the case, in which her own court, which had 
stood firm in resisting high level pressure to favor one of the parties, fi-
nally had been overruled by the Supreme Court. "All this to-do about a 
hedge," she said. "It was all so silly. We had to laugh about it." The 
manipulation had offended her professional sense of honor but not her 
sense of justice. 
It is this different attitude toward form which lies at the heart of 
most cognitive dissonances now clouding East-West German interac-
tions. I have had difficulties, for example, explaining to East German 
lawyers why that popular GDR practice of judges' regularly giving le-
gal advice to citizens whom they might later encounter as plaintiffs or 
defendants in the courtroom might conflict with judicial impartiality; 
why trials conducted before an "invited public" to drive home a partic-
ular moral lesson must have favored a particular outcome of the case 
and therefore could not be called unprejudiced; or why in reunited Ger-
many neofascists cannot more easily be locked up. Even if East German 
judges observed what to us loqks like demands of procedural fairness, 
they often would do so for motives quite different from our own. A for-
mer Liiritz judge once told me about a case involving a prosecution for 
attempted rape. As luck would have it, not only the judge but also the 
prosecutor and both lay assessors had been female. When the defendant, 
aghast at this phalanx of women, complained about their likely lack of 
sympathy for his case, the judge adjourned until the next day and went 
in ·search of some male lay assessors. Why did you do that, I asked. 
"Why, what use is a trial if the defendant is so upset that he won't talk 
to us?" she replied. It was not fairness she had been after but effective 
pedagogy. 
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Nonlawyers in the ex-GDR share this incomprehension over legal 
formality. The civil rights activist Barbel Bohley's famous complaint -
"We hoped for justice, but we got the Rechtsstaat" - echoes the dis-
appointment of people who longed for substantive justice and instead 
had to make do with the intricate and bewildering rules of an essentially 
foreign game. Today, many East Germans believe that they have been 
given stones instead of bread. What good can come of all these compli-
cated forms? And, for that matter, what good has come? 
* * * 
To sum up, East German legal professionals were not generalists 
but specialists, with relatively brief and narrow training, much lower 
status than Western jurists, little professional cohesiveness, accustomed 
to close supervision and control, unaggressive, supportive rather than 
critical, inexperienced in the free-for-all of Western litigation, and prob-
ably without much respect for, or even understanding of, the signifi-
cance of legal forms. No doubt about it-they were different. As the 
second man in the Berlin Administration of Justice, Detlef Borrmann, 
once told me: "They don't fit." For Undersecretary Borrmann, it was 
this lack of fit rather than any individual guilt that justified the Berlin 
policy of excluding all but 15% of East Berlin's judges and prosecutors 
from the united city's administration of justice.53 
But then, how could they "fit"? East German jurists are the prod-
ucts of their society, and it would be miraculous if they were not. Their 
entire country, one might argue, "does not fit," emerging, as it is, from 
a confining, coddling, and manipulating system of government in which 
law that needs freedom, contention, private property, money, and a mar-
ket to flourish played only a minor role. East German citizens, in this 
sense, "do not fit": used to withdrawing from an overbearing state into 
their private lives, inexperienced in the interactions of civil society, un-
accustomed to being left out in the cold, afraid of the competitiveness 
of the market, unfamiliar with its laws. As Gregor Gysi once said: East 
German citizens lived "as in a monarchy. " 54 Rules did not always hold, 
connections counted more than entitlements, decisions were never final, 
law just as easily could give way to leniency as to oppression. 
But East German lawyers were not only marked by the society 
from which they came. They were also, in significant ways, misfits in 
53. See Jutta Limbach, Der Aufbau des Rechtswesens in den ostlichen Bezirken 
Berlins, 46 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFf 2499 (1993). 
54. Gregor Gysi, Ober die Rechtsanwaltschaft im System der DDR, 24 
WIRTSCHAFTSREClIT 43, 44 (1993). 
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this society. This is most obviously true for the attorneys who (ex of 
ficio, so to speak) were expected to have a different opinion from the 
prosecution's and thus incorporated "a tiny bit of opposition"55 in a 
system afraid of discord. Not surprisingly, they always were viewed 
with suspicion. "Liberalist loners," the Minister of Justice Hilde 
Benjamin called them at a 1958 meeting on the state of East Germany's 
administration of justice. "The weakest link" in the system, her Under-
secretary Heinrich Toeplitz (who, two years, later would become Presi-
dent of the Supreme Court) agreed.56 At that time, the campaign to do-
mesticate the East German Bar by grouping its members in lawyers' 
collectives - so-called "colleges" - was in its fifth year; a little over 
half of all East German attorneys had been organized in colleges.57 
By the end of the GDR, 96% of the country's 606 attorneys were 
members of collectives,58 and most of them, motivated by what seemed 
a mixture of professional contrariness and a healthy instinct for what is 
feasible and profitable, had made some kind of uneasy peace with the 
system.59 But the profession never lost its faintly capitalist perfume of 
manipulative and clever contentiousness. Ordinary citizens, too, ap-
peared put off by what they saw as a lawyer's excessive preoccupation 
with private interests. We know this from complaints about attorneys 
submitted to the Ministry of Justice, which almost always criticize ei-
ther the financial morals of attorneys or their supposedly slick and po-
lemic ways of serving their clients. The comments also show how 
deeply at least some East German citizens had become imbued with the 
Party's dislike of discord. "In my opinion, no attorney practicing in our 
country should be allowed to behave in such fashion," a man com-
plaining about the aggressive lawyering of his ex-wife's attorney writes 
in 1987. Another disappointed litigant in 1988: "Until now, I believed 
that lawyers practicing in our state had to fairly defend the interests of 
our citizens instead of spending all their energies on the one client who 
paid them." And, in March 1989, a complainant criticizes an attorney 
whose name I recognize from mY Liiritz files: "Instead of seeking con-
ciliation, he only searched for conflict. I was unpleasantly surprised to 
55. Id. at 43. 
56. A report on the meeting is contained in a collection of documents on East Ger-
man lawyers' collectives, or "colleges," now held by the Federal Archives in Potsdam. 
57. See Thomas Lorenz, Die "Kollektivierung" der Rechtsanwaltschaft - als 
Methode zur systematischen Abschaffung der freien Advokatur, in STEUERUNG DER Jus-
TIZ IN DER DDR, supra note 2, at 409, 426. 
58. Id. 
59. See Lorenz, supra note 57, at 427 ("The majority of (East German) attorneys 
had made their peace with the circumstances in which they found themselves; only a 
fraction fought aggressively for the preservation and extension of civic rights."). 
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find that such demeanor is tolerated in our legal system." Note the em-
phasis on "our" c;:ountry in these letters. Attorneys, even in a collective 
state like the GDR, stand for "my" and "mine." Asked by the Ministry 
to comment on the complaint, the Liiritz attorney gives the reply that 
every Western lawyer also would have given: the complainant "fails to 
see that I must exclusively represent the interests of my client. " 60 
In GDR times, it was not always easy to apply a lawyer's special 
skills to this task. A legal system that does not believe in precedents, 
for example (because not the older but the most current decision incor-
porates the correct Party line), does not reward a lawyer for the clever 
comparative analysis of case law. Still, in the course of the years, the 
East German legal system relaxed many of its ideological assumptions. 
Under the guidance of the Supreme Court, legal reasoning became in-
creasingly ambitious. While courts still would not cite other courts' de-
cisions, an attorney might use them to support his client's viewpoint in 
oral arguments or in his briefs. The East German law journal Neue 
Justiz, on its back cover, carried short summaries of recent case law, 
which conscientious lawyers would cut out and collect for future refer-
ence. Supreme Court case law, which since 1977 appeared only in a 
xeroxed, limited, and classified edition and which, for lawyers, was 
very hard to come by in the early 1980s,61 had become fairly easily 
available by the middle of the decade and - away from printed records 
- was cited. And there were other - in the Western sense, lawyer-like 
- methods by which an attorney np.ght further his client's interests: in 
a divorce suit, he could carefully establish the couple's assets, for exam-
ple, or in a prosecution for theft, he could dispute the value of the sto-
len objects. East German attorneys routinely used legal arguments to 
bolster individual autonomy: a decidedly "unsocialist" approach to law. 
East German judges and prosecutors, too, by their professional atti-
tudes and training were set apart from other survivors of socialism. All 
were taught to be orderly and meticulous in their work. All shared skills 
that at least potentially facilitat.ed their dissociation from an essentially 
fuzzy and ideologically loaded legal system: the arts of close reading, 
of precise articulation, of unambiguous definition, of analogical reason-
ing. These faculties should help them to adapt far more easily than their 
compatriots to the new times. Take a 1980 case from the Liiritz archive 
60. The complaints, and the responses, were investigated and filed by the Ministry 
of Justice of the GDR and are now held by the Federal Archives in Potsdam. 
61. In the early 1980s, attorneys from Liiritz wanting to check up on Supreme 
Court case law had to travel to the regional capital to use the only copy of the "Su-
preme Court Informations" available to lawyers in the region, which was kept at the 
head office of the regional lawyers' college. 
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that exemplifies both the strengths and weaknesses of socialist adjudica-
tion. It is a cohabitation case from one of the villages in the court's dis-
trict. After ten years of life together during which a couple pooled all 
its efforts and resources, the woman died, leaving the couple's common 
savings of more than DM 15,000 in a bank account under the woman's 
name. A law suit between the surviving cohabitant and the woman's 
statutory heirs followed, and the Liiritz court decided that since the sav-
ings were held in the woman's name, they were her property and under 
the rules of succession would have to go to a niece. The decision was 
upheld upon appeal. Knowing the protagonists and their life history first 
hand, the entire village was outraged. The mayor wrote to the Supreme 
Court suggesting that the judgment be quashed by way of cassation (a 
certiorari-type proceeding, also called "review in the supervisory in-
stance," that was initiated by the Supreme Court itself, usually upon 
suggestions by other institutions or by the parties). The Supreme Court 
wrote back a sympathetic and carefully worded reply that in effect said: 
"Sorry, law is law." 
Two features of this case stand out: the fact that all three courts, 
contrary to socialist philosophy, sided with formal and against substan-
tive justice and their unimaginative way of doing so. An American 
court, faced with the same facts, would have looked for unjust enrich-
ment, implied contract, or some other device that might at least have 
salvaged the survivor's own contributions to the couple's savings.62 In 
other words, an American court would have manipulated formal law in 
its search for justice, and with a perfectly good conscience, too. Social-
ist judges probably were too cautious and respectful to do so. As one 
West German judge said about his new East German colleagues: "They 
lack interpretive courage." "We would have been more precise," a for-
mer East German judge, now an attorney, told me when she described 
the differences between West German judges and her own former self. 
"We seem to have approached legal problems with clenched teeth," she 
added. Today, former East GefIJlan jurists seem a little shocked at some 
of the practices they encounter in capitalist courts, such as the surrepti-
tious plea-bargaining increasingly common even in West German crimi-
nal procedure. East German judges obeyed the law. They did not cut 
deals about it, and they certainly did not play with it. But their respect 
for the letter of the law sets GDR judges and prosecutors far apart from 
ordinary socialist citizens, who could not care less about the law, 
evaded it whenever possible and desirable, and at best accorded it Iim-
62. See, e.g., Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303 (Wis. 1987); Marvin v. Marvin, 557 
P.2d 106 (Cal. 1967). 
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ited instrumental use. Unlike their landsmen, East German jurists al-
ready have taken the first step towards the Rechtsstaat: formalism. The 
next step - filling that form with life - will be easier for them than 
for anybody else in the ex-GDR. 
* * * 
I have drawn a contradictory picture of East German jurists: differ-
ent from ourselves, yet also similar; both in line and at odds with the 
society they come from; not quite socialist fish nor capitalist fowl. Most 
of them greeted the Wende with anxious optimism. It threatened the se-
curity of their routines, but it also promised to relieve them of the ambi-
guities of their work. No more of that "dialectical unity of legality and 
Party spirit" under which at any moment "Party spirit" could under-
mine and defeat legality. At a meeting of Kreisgericht directors in De-
cember 1989 called to assess the situation after the collapse of the Wall, 
the Lii.ritz court director wrote into her notebook: "No more discussions 
about ongoing proceedings. No guidance by the Supreme Court or the 
Regional Court." "From now on, courts will enjoy considerably more 
authority than they did in the past," the director of the Rostock Re-
gional Court asserted in a letter of December 14, 1989, addressed to the 
mayor of Rostock in which she requested the use of the Rostock Secret 
Police headquarters, now vacated, to serve as an annex to her crowded 
courthouse. Elsewhere in the GDR, former Stasi buildings were simi-
larly claimed or reclaimed for judicial use.63 Those were symbolic 
moves: the Secret Police driven out by the Rule of Law. 
But one can also hear the worried tremor of voices whistling in the 
dark. With the growing anarchy of post-Wende days, and with mounting 
public anger at those who for decades had ordered citizens about, 
judges and prosecutors too began to fear for their positions. A "Justice 
Committee," set up, as in many other East German towns, by the Lii.ritz 
City Council to investigate "injustices, misuses of authority, and unjus-
tified privileges" of state functionaries, soon got sidetracked by largely 
exaggerated stories of Party luxuries and never accused local courts of 
any wrongdoing. But their association with an authoritarian and corrupt 
regime condemned judges and prosecutors nonetheless. I doubt that 
most felt very guilty: looking back upon their disciplined and modest 
professional lives, they probably thought that they had done the best 
they could. "Judges can produce no better case law than their legal sys-
63. In Potsdam, for instance, the district court in 1989 moved back into its tum-of-
the-century courthouse that for many years had been occupied by the Stasi. See 
MARKovrrs, supra note 3, at 165. 
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tern will support," the Liiritz court director wrote in her lecture notes at 
yet another judges' meeting in February 1990. Would it be enough of 
an excuse? 
From the first days of the Wende, GDR lawyers thus oscillated be-
tween hope and fear. But in the months immediately following the col-
lapse of socialism, hope was dominant. A former judge once described 
to me the first and last meeting of the East German Association of 
Judges (Richterbund, dissolved, and swallowed by the West German 
Judges' League, upon Reunification Day) in June 1990 in East Berlin's 
biggest courthouse, the former Stadtgericht in the Littenstrasse: how 
judges had come from all over the GDR to take part in a new begin-
ning, crowding the balconies around the building's beautiful rotunda, 
dizzy with the sudden changes, excited by their new autonomy, fearful 
of the future. 64 
But in those early days, East German lawyers still believed that 
they could play a part in it. Relations between East and West German 
lawyers seemed simple. Common seminars and working groups sprang 
from the ground like mushrooms. West Germans were encouraging and 
supportive. East Germans were eager to learn: looking for advice, for 
inspiration, for allies for the days of reckoning that looked more and 
more inevitable. They also were willing to inspect their own past, dis-
cover what went wrong, acknowledge guilt, and learn from their mis-
takes. When they were searching for words to describe and denounce 
the past, East Germans did not yet fear that everything they said would 
be held against them. The GDR Richterbund, for instance, developed 
criteria for a self-examination process that would weed out those too 
deeply compromised by their subordination to the Party, and the term 
"vorauseilender Gehorsam" ("anticipatory obedience") figured in the 
East Germans' own catalogue of socialist sins. Their belief in the need 
for change was tempered by fears for their own survival. But it was not 
yet buried under West German suspicions. 
Because of its many legal implications, lawyers seemed natural 
leaders in the GDR's political transformation. More than others, they 
had at least some of the skills needed in the new society: arguing, bar-
gaining, familiarity with legal forms. For the first time in GDR history, 
lawyers began to occupy positions of political influence: Gregor Gysi 
(head of the new Party for Democratic Socialism), Lothar de Maiziere 
(first Prime Minister). I believe that GDR lawyers would have made 
good mediators between East and West: sharing the social concerns of 
64. See also Andreas Gangel, Die DDR-Justiz im Prozess der "Wende," in 
STEUERUNG DER JUSTIZ IN DER DDR, supra note 2, at 429. 
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their fellow citizens but more than they willing to concede the need for 
rules; confused ~emselves, but better able to articulate their confusion 
and with a better grasp of what one needed to learn. 
In the event, West German reconstruction policies excluded no 
other East German professional group from participating in the remak-
ing of their own country as thoroughly as legal professionals. Today, 
those former judges and prosecutors who passed the vetting process are, 
as a rule, too young, too inexperienced, and too preoccupied with learn-
ing the ropes to be able or willing to push for reform. East German law-
yers presently in private practice - most of whom are not former attor-
neys but ex-judges, -prosecutors, -jurisconsults, and newly admitted 
Diplomjuristen - are struggling to survive in the new market and also 
are unlikely to peddle reform proposals with the smell of socialism. 
Former socialist academics have disappeared from East German law 
faculties. As a result, the legal debate in the Federal Republic is domi-
nated by Westerners. When in 1991 the German Association of Admin-
istrative and Constitutional Law Teachers convened to discuss East Ger-
many's integration into the rule of law, not a single East German law 
teacher spoke up and, for all I know, was even invited. 65 When a year 
later the first postreunification Convention of German Lawyers took 
place in Hannover, of the roughly 2600 participants, only about twenty-
five had come from the new East German states. 66 East German jurists 
do not appear at national meetings, have no real voice other than the 
PDS and the journal Neue Justiz (the first considered disreputable, the 
second ignored by most Westerners), and are unlikely to leave a mark 
on the profession. The rule of law in Germany's Eastern half - con-
ceived by Westerners, built by Westerners, staffed with Westerners, and, 
by all signs, efficiently and smoothly run by Westerners - is likely to 
remain for some time a largely Western enterprise. 
I see two problems with this development. One concerns legal cul-
ture in the former GDR. Truly democratic reform must be self-made. 
Yet East Germans today do not.experience the Rechtsstaat as something 
self-made, but as something others - West Germans - imposed on 
65. See Der Rechtsstaat und die Aufarbeitung der vorrechtsstaatlichen 
Vergangenheit, Berichte und Diskussionen auf der Tagung der Vereinigung der 
Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer in Giessen vom 2. bis 5. Oktober 1991, 51 VVDSTRL 9 
(1992). 
66. See Horst Sendler, Gesamtdeutscher Juristentag?, 25 ZEITSCHRIF'f FiiR 
REcHTSPOLITIK 449 (1992). Sendler also reports that at the previous annual convention 
in September, 1991 - post-Wende but pre-unification - of the roughly 3500 partici-
pants, about 300 had come from East Germany - evidence of the cautious optimism 
East German lawyers, at that time, still felt when considering their own role in the es-
tablishment of the Rechtsstaat. 
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them from the outside. The West German colonization of East Ger-
many's administration of justice deprived East Germans of a role and 
voice in their own liberation and turned events that might have been ca-
thartic into impositions. That may be one of the reasons why East 
Germans today seem strangely disaffected by the legal system that they 
themselves use in ever-growing numbers. According to a 1995 opinion 
poll, 53% of East Germans consider their present social system to be 
unfair; 73% believe that the law does not ensure equal protection; 60% 
are dissatisfied with German case law and legislation; and 72% do not 
feel protected by the law.67 The rule of law has not won over the hearts 
and minds of former socialists. 
My second worry concerns historic memory in Germany. It is al-
ways difficult to face unpleasant periods and events as part of one's 
own make-up. West Germany avoided that look into the mirror when, in 
1951, it quietly integrated former Nazi judges and prosecutors into its 
new administration of justice. Today, the almost total exchange of legal 
elites in the former GDR - West for East - may well prevent both 
sides' coming to terms with Germany's communist and anticommunist 
past. Usually, proponents of a thorough cleansing of socialist official-
dom advance just the opposite argument: we must not repeat our post-
war leniency towards the Nazis, they say, that also enabled us to stay 
mute about the crimes of the regime that they represented. Even assum-
ing that the evils of Hitler and Honecker could be equated, that argu-
ment is unpersuasive. The integration of Nazi judges and prosecutors 
was an internal West German affair: one hand washed the other, and the 
resulting silence lulled the consciences of both pardoners and pardoned. 
The present German reunification process is a coming together of oppo-
sites, with built-in discords and clashes, and the inevitable criticism and 
disagreement arising on both sides should make it impossible to sweep 
past injustices silently under the carpet. But the uneven distribution of 
power and the fact that in the process of national soul-searching only 
the victors may pose all the qu.estions raises another danger: that under 
the weight of Western accusations, East Germans become defensive, 
clam up, excuse behavior they otherwise would criticize, and begin to 
look upon the search for historic truth as other peoples' business. A re-
cent study of East European attitudes towards the socialist past seems to 
justify this fear: despite the fact that the East Germans supported their 
regime with less reluctance than did most of their socialist neighbors, 
they are today less likely to find fault with their own biographies than 
67. See Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, Rechtsbewusstsein im wiedervereinigten 
Deutsch/and, 16 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR REcHTSSOZIOLOGIE 121, 123-25 (1995). 
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former Czechs· or Romanians.68 Ideally, the process of Germany's 
reunification coul~ have been a historic learning process for both sides. 
Instead, West German self-righteousness and East German defensive-
ness are likely to block, once again, a difficult and troubling past from 
German view. 
* * * 
But perhaps I have drawn a typically German picture of events: 
unnecessarily ponderous and gloomy and with an exaggerated view of 
the significance of ideology. Perhaps what people think matters not 
nearly so much as how they actually behave. Perhaps, instead of argu-
ing that things went badly, one could with equal justification argue that 
they went extraordinarily well. East German courts are functioning 
smoothly and efficiently. Litigation rates are soaring.69 In Liiritz, where 
in 1988 five judges (three of them women) had decided an annual total 
of 1027 cases, in 1995, eight judges (all of them men, and only one an 
East German) together decided 4494 cases.70 Over 1200 suits alone 
were filed by tenants complaining about rent increases after the recent 
easing of rent controls in East Germany - the new citizens use the law 
to defend their interests. Instead of three attorneys, as in socialist days, 
Liiritz now has thirty-three: twenty-three West Germans and ten East 
Germans, among them several former judges and prosecutors who did 
not pass, or did not try to pass, the vetting process. Although several of 
them are struggling, some of the Western newcomers also find it hard to 
hold their own against the competition. 
East German citizens seem to prefer East German counsel: not 
only because they are cheaper but also because they are more sympa-
thetic and attentive listeners. At present, legal business in the former 
GDR seems to be distributed in line with the pre-Wende structural dif-
ferences between the two legal systems: personal matters, like family or 
68. See Uwe Ewald, Strafrecht und Umgang mit der staatssozialistischen 
Vergangenheit in Liindern Mittel- und Osteuropas, in "UNRECHrSSTAAT"? POLITISCHE 
JUSTIZ UND DIE AUFARBErruNG DER DDR-VERGANGENHEIT 64 (Lothar Bisky et al. eds., 
1994). 
69. First-instance civil law case loads in the five new East Gennan states rose 
from a total of76,800 new suits filed in 1991to317,600 suits filed in 1994. See Sabine 
Leutheusser-Schnarrenberger, Wege zur Justizentlastung, 48 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHEN-
SCHRIFr 2441 (1995). In 1988, in the then-GDR, a total of 62,210 first-instance civil 
cases were filed. See STATISTISCHES JAHRBUCH DER DEUTSCHEN DEMOKRATISCHEN REPUB-
LIK 1989, at 399. 
70. The figures include cases from civil, family, and criminal law, but exclude la-
bor law disputes, which no longer are adjudicated in Liiritz, but now go to a special la-
bor court in a nearby town serving a much larger area than the present Liiritz 
Amtsgericht. 
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labor law disputes, tend to go to East German attorneys, moderate-size 
financial disputes. go to both East and West German lawyers, and the 
big; complex, and financially rewarding litigation is handled by West 
German law firms or by their East German branch offices. Native East 
German lawyers occasionally complain about this unwritten pecking or-
der, report tensions between East and West members of some new 
"mixed" law offices, or are hurt by what they perceive as West Gennan 
snootiness or exclusivity. "What we now lack most is callousness," one 
East German attorney told a British interviewer.71 Even if the statement 
exaggerates the callousness of Western lawyers, it correctly reflects East 
German perceptions of what the Rechtsstaat is about and is a testimony 
to what went wrong in Germany's legal reunification. "Have you 
changed since the Wende?" I asked an attorney in my little town. "I 
hope not," he replied, "at least not in my basic attitudes." But he ad-
mitted to some change already: he no longer accepts clients whom he 
knows will be unlikely ever to pay him. And when I recently called him 
again and found him strangely inattentive during our conversation, he 
revealed a further symptom of adjustment. "You must excuse me," he 
said; "But while we're talking, I am also trying to fix something on my 
computer screen." 
* * * 
If you look up "lustration" in Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary of 1971, you will find a definition reflecting simpler times: 
"Purificatory ceremony performed as a preliminary to entering a holy 
place. " 72 The religious emphasis should give us pause. The Rechtsstaat 
is no holy place. On the contrary, it is a place structured by laws that 
are well aware of its unholy nature. The rule of law does not strive for 
a "new man" but trusts that the old Adam, if only he sticks to the rules 
of the game, can govern himself. Even the old socialist Adam. 
71. Gisela Shaw, East German "Rechtsanwiilte" and German Unification, 61 GER· 
MAN LIFE AND LETIERS, NEW SERIES no. 2, at 211, 224 (1994). 
72. WEBSTER'S TIDRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1348 {16th ed. 1971). 
